Patenting the Human Genome by Eisenberg, Rebecca S.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1990
Patenting the Human Genome
Rebecca S. Eisenberg
University of Michigan Law School, rse@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1216
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eisenberg, Rebecca S. "Patenting the Human Genome." Emory L. J. 39 (1990): 721-45.
PATENTING THE HUMAN GENOME--
Rebecca S. Eisenberg*
The increasing promise of federal funding for mapping and sequencing
the human genome1 has brought with it renewed attention in the research
science community to issues of intellectual property protection for prod-
ucts of biotechnology research. Echoing concerns raised a decade ago in
the debate over commercialization of academic biomedical research,2 scien-
tists have called for the free availability of all information generated
through the Human Genome Project and have argued against allowing
private intellectual property rights in such knowledge.' Meanwhile, pri-
vate parties have quietly been obtaining patents on bits and pieces of the
human genome from the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).4
Notwithstanding the willingness of the PTO to issue these patents, the
t Copyright o 1990 Rebecca S. Eisenberg.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I wish to thank Jim Stevens for many
hours of helpful research assistance.
' See Norman, Bush Budget Highlights R&D, 247 SCIENCE 517 (1990) (reporting increase in
funding for Human Genome Project from S87 million in 1990 to $154 million in the Bush Adminis-
tration's proposed budget for 1991).
2 See generally Commercialization of Academic Biomedical Research: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of
the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
1 See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME OF THE NA-
TIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MAPPING AND SEQUENCING THE HUMAN GENOME 99-100 (1988)
[hereinafter NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT]; McKusick, Mapping and Se-
quencing the Human Genome, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 910, 912 (1989); Arnst, Scientists Working
on World Effort to Map All Human Genes, REUTERS (June 12, 1989) (NEXIS, Wires Library).
Curiously, some of these scientists have assumed that patent protection for DNA sequence informa-
tion is not available, and that copyright laws offer the only relevant intellectual property rights. See,
e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 99-100. In fact, copyright pro-
tection for DNA sequences has failed to make its mark outside the scholarly literature. See I. COP-
PER, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW § 11.02 (1989); Burk, Copyrightability of Recombinant DNA
Sequences, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 469 (1989); Goldstein, Copyrightability of Genetic Works, Bio/TECH-
NOLOGY, Feb. 1984, at 138; Kayton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 191 (1982).
" See, e.g., U.S. Patent 4,370,417, 1026 Official Gazette Pat. Off. 1315 (Jan. 25, 1983) (claiming
DNA sequence for plasminogen activator protein); U. S. Patent 4,703,008, 1083 Official Gazette Pat.
Off. 2038 (Oct. 27, 1987) (claiming DNA sequence for erythropoietin); U.S. Patent 4,713,332, 1085
Official Gazette Pat. Off. 1386 (Dec. 15, 1987) (claiming DNA sequence for human T cell antigen
receptor); U.S. Patent 4,757,006, 1092 Official Gazette Pat. Off. 878 (July 12, 1988) (claiming re-
combinant vectors containing DNA sequence for human factor VIII:C).
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patents may still be vulnerable to challenges to their validity in the courts.
Patent claims to human DNA sequences raise unresolved issues under
traditional patent doctrine. Moreover, even if the patent claims are valid
under existing law, one might question the wisdom of issuing patents on
DNA sequences in the human genome to private parties, particularly at a
time .when the government is devoting public resources to a concerted re-
search effort to generate this information. This Article examines some of
these issues.
I. DOCTRINAL IMPEDIMENTS TO PATENT PROTECTION FOR DNA
SEQUENCES
A United States patent confers the exclusive right to make, use or sell
the patented invention in the United States for a period of seventeen
years.' During the term of the patent, the patent holder has the right to
prevent anyone from using the invention - even an innocent infringer
who develops the same invention independently.' In exchange for these
broad exclusive rights, the inventor must disclose the invention to the pub-
lic in terms that are sufficient to enable others "skilled in the art" to make
and use it.' Judicial decisions characterize the enabling disclosure in the
patent as the "quid pro quo" of the patent monopoly.' In order to obtain
a patent, the applicant must first contribute "a measure of worthwhile
knowledge to the public storehouse."9
It is a fundamental axiom of patent law that one may patent only that
which is new. Section 101 of the Patent Act defines as patentable subject
matter "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composi-
tion of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 10 These cate-
gories of statutory subject matter tend to limit patent protection to inven-
tions in fields of applied technology, as opposed to basic scientific
5 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988); R. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 110-11 (1988).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
8 See United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933) (disclosure and
the consequent benefits to the community are consideration for the patent); Grant v. Raymond, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 247 (1832) (disclosure is the preliminary requirement to issuing a patent).
Application of Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J. concurring).
O 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The requirement that an invention be "new" is elaborated upon in
35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
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research.'" In addition to being new and useful, an invention must satisfy
the further statutory requirement of nonobviousness 12 to be patentable.
One may not obtain a patent by disclosing a claimed "invention" that is
already available to the public, whether it is available because it is previ-
ously known or because it is readily discoverable through obvious ad-
vances over the prior art.
An intuitively appealing objection to patent protection for DNA se-
quences in the human genome is that the sequences themselves are not
new. The human genome resides in every cell of every human being.
DNA sequences within this genome exist quite apart from the inventive
efforts of the private parties who might seek to patent them, and thus no
one may claim to have invented them.
A similar argument persuaded a majority of the Supreme Court in the
1948 case of Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co."a The plain-
tiff in Funk Brothers held a patent on a mixed culture of different strains
of bacteria, each of which was useful to inoculate the roots of different
species of leguminous plants, allowing the plants to fix nitrogen from the
air. 4 The different species of root-nodule bacteria each existed in nature
and had long been available separately in the market, although in the past
it had been necessary to buy different inoculants for different crops. Previ-
ous efforts at combining the different species of bacteria in a mixed cul-
ture suitable for inoculating a range of crops had failed because the differ-
ent species inhibited each other's effectiveness when combined. The
plaintiff's contribution lay in discovering strains of each species of root-
nodule bacteria that were not mutually inhibitive and combining these
strains in a single mixed-culture inoculant.
" See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97
YALE L.J. 177, 186-87 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Rights and Norms].
12 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13-19 (1966)
(interpreting § 103 as a codification of case law requiring an independent determination of nonobvi-
ousness as a prerequisite to patentability).
33 U.S. 127 (1948).
" An illustrative claim from the patent reads:
An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibi-
tive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being unaf-
fected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for
which they are specific.
Id. at 128 n.l.
1990] 723
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Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held the patent claims to the
mixed culture invalid, reasoning that
patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of na-
ture. . . . The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature,
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none."
He noted that the patentee created no new bacteria and that the bacteria
in the mixed culture "serve the ends nature originally provided and act
quite independently of any effort of the patentee.""
A broad reading of Funk Brothers would argue against patent protec-
tion for naturally occurring DNA sequences, perhaps even when those
sequences are combined with other natural materials to create new recom-
binant organisms. One could argue that DNA sequences are "manifesta-
tions of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none." 17 Moreover, much of the impetus for cloning human genes arises
from the fact that these genes continue to "serve the ends nature originally
provided" when they are expressed in recombinant organisms. The
universality of the genetic code ensures that recombinant bacteria can
make the same proteins as human cells if they are provided with the right
DNA sequences. Thus these human DNA sequences continue to perform
their natural functions when they are incorporated in recombinant orga-
nisms, just as the different species of root-nodule bacteria continued to
perform their natural functions when incorporated in a mixed-culture
:5 Id. at 130 (citation omitted).
,8 Id. at 131. Douglas rejected the argument that the patent holder had gone beyond discovering
a law of nature to make a new and different composition of non-inhibitive strains, noting that "that
aggregation of species fell short of invention within the meaning of the patent statutes." This last
remark suggests that the problem with the patent was not that the claimed invention lacked novelty or
fell outside the categories of statutory subject matter as a product of nature, but rather that the inven-
tion was obvious. Indeed, Professor Chisum argues that the claimed invention was not a true product
of nature because the claimed mixed culture did not exist in a natural form, and that the decision "is
perhaps best viewed as an interpretation of the nonobviousness or 'invention' requirement, and not of
the statutory classes of subject matter." 1 D. CHsSUM, PATENTS § 1.02[7] (1990). But much of the
language of the opinion supports a broader prohibition on patenting "products of nature," even in
novel combinations.
17 Cf Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1759 (D. Mass. 1989)
(noting that the DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin "is a nonpatentable natural phenome-
non 'free to all men and reserved exclusively to none,'" although a "purified and isolated" DNA
sequence encoding the same protein might be patentable).
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inoculant.
Although the Funk Brothers decision has never been overruled, in ret-
rospect it seems to represent the high-water mark in the "products of na-
ture" doctrine. Subsequent case law does not deny patent protection to all
inventions composed of naturally occurring products or manifesting laws
of nature. Instead, the cases suggest that the patentability of such inven-
tions turns on whether the claimed invention is a new product or process
resulting from human intervention and, if so, whether the invention is
obvious in light of the prior art, including previously available natural
products.
A. Patentable Subject Matter and Novelty
The Supreme Court revisited the question of patentability of biotech-
nology inventions in its 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.18 The
invention at issue in that case was a living microorganism into which the
inventor had introduced multiple naturally occurring bacterial plasmids.
These plasmids, or rings of bacterial DNA, contained genetic information
that gave the transformed organism the capacity to break down multiple
components of crude oil. The patent examiner rejected claims to the bacte-
ria on the alternative grounds that (1) they were "products of nature" and
(2) as living organisms they were not within the scope of patentable sub-
ject matter. The Patent and Trademark Office concluded that the new
bacteria were not "products of nature" because bacteria containing the
multiple plasmids did not occur in nature,19 but nonetheless affirmed the
rejection of the claims on the alternative ground that living organisms are
not patentable.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a living, genetically altered
organism may qualify for patent protection as a new "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" under section 101 of the Patent Act.2 The Court
distinguished Funk Brothers on the ground that while the patent holder
in that case had not altered the function of any of the species of root-
nodule bacteria in the mixed-culture inoculant, Chakrabarty had created
'a 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
19 Id. at 306 n.3.
20 Id. at 308-09.
1990]
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"a new bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found
in nature."21 His discovery was thus "not nature's handiwork, but his
own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter ... "22 In support of its
broad construction of the categories of patentable subject matter, the Court
quoted language from the Committee Reports accompanying the 1952
Patent Act to the effect that Congress intended statutory subject matter to
"include anything under the sun that is made by man."2
Under Chakrabarty, the relevant inquiry for distinguishing between
patentable subject matter and unpatentable products of nature is whether
the claimed invention is the result of human intervention. Focusing this
inquiry on human DNA sequences, one might still conclude that they
should not be patentable as such, although there might be patentable in-
vention in the creation of recombinant materials that incorporate human
genes. For example, a scientist who identifies the DNA sequence for a
human protein, incorporates the sequence in a recombinant plasmid, and
introduces the plasmid into a recombinant bacterial host cell might be able
to claim the recombinant plasmid and the transformed host cell as patent-
able inventions. These recombinant materials do not occur in nature but
are the result of human intervention, much like the plasmid-transformed
bacteria in Chakrabarty.24 On the other hand, the DNA sequence itself,
like the bacterial strains in Funk Brothers, exists in nature quite apart
from the efforts of the inventor and, therefore, should not be patentable
21 Id. at 310. One could quarrel with this distinction. Both patents claimed combinations of
naturally occurring elements, and in both cases the combination itself did not exist in nature.
22 Id.
21 Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952) and H.R. REP. No. 1923,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
The Patent and Trademark Office relied on this language in deciding to extend patent protection to
"nonnaturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals." See Non-
naturally Occurring Non-Human Animals Are Patentable Under § 101, 33 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 927, at 664 (Apr. 23, 1987).
"t See, e.g., U.S. Patent 4,757,006, 1092 Official Gazette Pat. Off. 878 (July 12, 1988). This
patent claims, inter alia:
1. An isolated recombinant vector containing DNA coding for human factor VIII:C, com-
prising a polydeoxyribonucleotide having the [following] sequence:
4. A non-human recombinant expression vector for human factor VIII:C comprising a
DNA segment having the [following] sequence:
5. A transformed non-human mammalian cell line containing the expression vector of
claim 4.
[Vol. 39
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unless it has been altered somehow by human intervention.25
But even if the claimed DNA sequence is identical to a sequence that
exists in nature, it may still fall within the categories of patentable subject
matter if the patent applicant has made the sequence available in an iso-
lated or purified form that does not exist in nature.26 A substantial body
of case law holds that newly isolated or purified materials may be pat-
ented even though those materials exist in nature in an impure state, at
least if the purified materials offer some advantage in utility over the nat-
urally-occurring impure materials." For example, in Merck & Co. v.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,2 the inventors obtained a patent on pu-
" A cloned gene may in fact have a somewhat different DNA sequence than the corresponding
chromosomal DNA sequence from which it was transcribed. This is because cloned genes generally
are derived from the messenger RNA corresponding to the desired gene rather than obtained directly
from the chromosomes of a cell. Chromosomal DNA includes regulatory sequences ahd extraneous
information or "introns" that do not appear in the messenger RNA from which complementary DNA
(eDNA) strands are made. Assuming that a sequence identical to that of the cDNA clone does not
occur naturally in human cells without any intervention, then the cDNA sequence itself might be
sufficiently distinct from the naturally occurring DNA sequence to be a new composition of matter
rather than an unpatentable product of nature. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COM-
MITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 13-19, 57-58.
' See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1759 (D. Mass.
1989), upholding the validity of claims of U.S. Patent 4,703,008, supra note 4, to purified and iso-
lated DNA sequences as well as recombinant vectors and host cells used to produce erythropoietin
(EPO). Claim 2 of that patent reads as follows:
2. A purified and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence encod-
ing human erythropoietin.
The court rejected plaintiff's arguments that the claimed invention was "the DNA sequence encoding
human EPO," noting that sequence is a "nonpatentable natural phenomenon." Amgen, 13
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1759. Instead, the court construed the claim as limited to the "purified and isolated"
DNA sequence. Id.
27 See, e.g., In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (pure prostaglandins isolated from
nature patentable as new products); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95 (S.D.N.Y.
1911), affid, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (purified adrenalin composition patentable in view of fact that
patent holder was the first to make adrenalin available for therapeutic use by removing it from the
other gland-tissue in which it was found); Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken, 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910),
cert. denied, 220 U.S. 622 (1911) (upholding validity of patent on acetyl salicylic acid to first inventor
to develop process for producing it in sufficiently pure state to render it therapeutically available). See
also In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902
(1978), on remand, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub nom. Parker v. Bergy,
444 U.S. 924 (1979), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot sub nom. Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980) (biologically pure culture of the microorganism streptomyces
vellosus patentable since it did not exist in nature in a pure form and could be produced only under
carefully controlled laboratory conditions).
28 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
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rifled vitamin B 12 isolated from fermentation materials. Vitamin B 12 was
produced naturally in minute quantities in the livers of cattle and in cer-
tain microorganisms. The Fourth Circuit nonetheless upheld the validity
of the patent, noting that the patented product was superior to the previ-
ously available vitamin B12 from cattle because of its relatively abundant
supply, cheap price, freedom from toxic substances, and amenability to
control of potency and dosage.29 The court called into question the vitality
of the "products of nature" doctrine, observing:
There is nothing in the language of the Act which precludes the
issuance of a patent upon a "product of nature" when it is a "new
and useful composition of matter" and there is compliance with the
specified conditions for patentability. . . . The "matter" of which
patentable new and useful compositions are composed necessarily in-
cludes naturally existing elements and materials.3°
This language suggests that there is no bar to patenting a "product of
nature," assuming the invention is new, useful, falls within the categories
of patentable subject matter set forth in section 101, and otherwise satis-
fies the statutory requirements for patent protection. On the other hand,
since the court went to the trouble of pointing out the utilitarian advan-
tages of the purified product over the naturally-occurring impure product,
one might conclude that these advantages were important to the court's
conclusion that the purified product was a new composition of matter.
In the more recent case of In re Bergstrom, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals rejected the argument that there were impediments to pat-
ent protection for "naturally occurring" products beyond those set forth in
the patent statute. 1 The court reversed a rejection of claims to purified
prostaglandins, noting that any differences in the usefulness or other
properties of the purified products compared to the impure materials ex-
isting in nature would be relevant only in determining the obviousness of
the claimed invention under section 103 and not in determining its status
as patentable subject matter under section 101.11 The same court extended
29 Id. at 161 n.6.
0 Id. at 161-62.
31 427 F.2d 1394, 1401 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
32 Id. at 1401-02. Cf. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980) (noting that
Chakrabarty created an organism with properties possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria and
"having the potential for significant utility").
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the rationale of the cases upholding the patentability of purified chemicals
in In re Bergy,"3 reversing the rejection of a patent claim to a "biologically
pure culture" of a naturally occurring microorganism on the ground that
the pure culture did not exist in nature and could be produced only under
carefully controlled laboratory conditions.
3 4
Applying these principles to human DNA sequences, one could argue
that a newly cloned human gene that previously existed within the chro-
.mosomes of human cells is analogous to a newly isolated or purified chem-
ical that previously existed in impure form. In each case, the inventor has
arguably created a new composition of matter by identifying something
that previously existed only in combination with other materials and mak-
ing this new composition more readily accessible for human purposes.
Cloned genes are certainly useful in ways that the same DNA sequences
found in the chromosomes of human cells are not. Once a gene has been
cloned, it may be replicated and expressed in a recombinant host cell,
creating numerous copies of the gene for purposes of sequencing and
study. Moreover, a cloned gene provides a means of producing its corre-
sponding protein in larger quantities and in a more pure form than may
be obtained conveniently from human cells. The cloned gene thus has dis-
tinct advantages over the gene as it exists naturally in the chromosomes of
human cells, just as purified vitamin B12 has distinct advantages over im-
pure vitamin B12 as it exists in cow liver.
In sum, while the question remains debatable, newly cloned DNA se-
quences from the human genome may well be within the range of patent-
able subject matter as new compositions of matter.
B. Nonobviousness
Even if a claim to a DNA sequence survives a challenge based on lack
of patentable subject matter or lack of novelty, it may still be held invalid
on the ground that the invention would have been obvious at the time it
3 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated sub nom. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978), on*
remand, In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted sub norn. Parker v. Bergy, 444 U.S.
924 (1979), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot sub nom. Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
31 563 F.2d at 1035.
1990]
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was made to a person having ordinary skill in the field in light of the
prior art. 5 While the novelty requirement asks whether the claimed in-
vention is new, the nonobviousness requirement asks whether the claimed
invention represents enough of an advance over the prior art to deserve
patent protection. Since the obviousness of an invention is measured
against the background of human knowledge at the time the invention is
made, this requirement is increasingly difficult to pass as scientific knowl-
edge advances in a field.
The fact that the Patent and Trademark Office has issued patents on
some DNA sequences thus does not necessarily portend that such patents
will continue to issue in the future. Even without any change in existing
law, it is likely that scientific advances in biotechnology and related fields
will make future DNA sequences obvious as of the time they are identi-
fied. For example, improved cloning techniques and DNA sequencing
techniques may render the successful identification of the DNA sequence
in a gene of interest routine and predictable. For that matter, advances in
protein chemistry that facilitate the separation, purification, and amino
acid sequencing of proteins of interest could make the cloning and se-
quencing of genes corresponding to these proteins a trivial scientific
achievement, well within the ordinary skill of biotechnology practitioners.
The courts have sometimes upheld the validity of claims to newly puri-
fied chemicals over challenges that they were obvious in light of previously
existing impure products." Although I have found no court decisions in-
validating claims to DNA sequences on grounds of obviousness, the Patent
and Trademark Office has rejected such claims on this basis.3" To estab-
35 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). See, e.g., Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. &
Int. 1987) (affirming rejection of claim to polyploid oysters on ground that invention was obvious
under section 103, although disapproving examiner's rejection of same claim on ground that claimed
oysters are living entities and "controlled by laws of nature" and therefore outside scope of patentable
subject matter under section 101).
To determine whether an invention is obvious within the meaning of section 103, it is necessary to
consider the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17
(1966).
36 See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 159-61 (4th Cir.
1958) (reviewing in detail the efforts of the inventors to isolate and purify vitamin B1 2 and noting
that the prior art did not suggest use of the materials from which inventors ultimately were able to
purify vitamin B1 2 ).
" See Murashige, Section 1021103 Issues in Biotechnology Patent Prosecution, 16 AIPLA
[Vol. 39
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lish nonobviousness in such cases, one must show the difficulty and unpre-
dictability of cloning the desired gene. If enough is known about the pro-
tein corresponding to the desired gene to permit its preparation in pure
form, it is likely that the patent examiner will reject any claims to the
protein-encoding DNA sequence on the ground that the invention is obvi-
ous in light of known cloning techniques."8
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has considered obvi-
ousness challenges to the validity of biotechnology patent claims in two
cases. The earlier of these cases, Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibo-
dies, Inc., 9 suggests a more generous attitude toward the validity of the
claims than the more recent case, In re O'Farrell.4 °
In Hybritech, the plaintiff held a process patent on a "sandwich assay"
for detecting the presence of antigenic substances in fluid samples using
monoclonal antibodies. 1 The district court held the claims invalid on
grounds of obviousness. In doing so, the court relied on prior art showing
ways to prepare monoclonal antibodies, and also showing similar assays
using conventional polyclonal antibodies.42 The Federal Circuit reversed,
noting that the prior art references were no more than "invitations to try
monoclonal antibodies in immunoassays" that "do not suggest how that
end might be accomplished.1
4
Two years later, in In re O'Farrell, the Federal Circuit affirmed the
PTO's rejection of patent claims to a method for producing proteins in
bacterial host cells on grounds of obviousness.4 4 The claimed method in-
volved inserting the target gene in a plasmid in the middle of the DNA
for a bacterial protein, and then introducing the plasmid into the bacterial
host. In attempting to express the gene for the bacterial protein, the host
would then "read through" to express the target gene, creating a fused
Q.J. 294, 297 (1988-89); Wiseman, Biotechnology Patent Practice - A Primer, 16 AIPLA Q.J.
394, 409-10 (1988-89).
38 Murashige, supra note 37, at 297-99.
" 802 F.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
40 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4" 802 F.2d at 1370.
42 Id. at 1372-74
" Id. at 1380. The court also cited the commercial success of the plaintiff's assays and their
unexpected advantages over previously available assays as secondary factors indicating the nonobvious-
ness of the invention. Id. at 1382-84.
" 853 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1990]
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protein that included the amino acid sequence coded for by the target
gene.45
The most significant prior art reference was an article co-authored by
two of the three co-inventor patent applicants46 describing the use of a
similar technique to introduce a gene coding for a ribosomal RNA into a
bacterial host cell. The authors noted evidence that the bacterial host was
expressing the foreign gene and suggested that by substituting a gene cod-
ing for a protein in lieu of the ribosomal RNA gene, one might be able to
cause the bacterial host cell to produce the protein.47 The Federal Circuit
agreed with the PTO that this article made the substitution of the gene
for a protein obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
invention was made.
The court rejected the argument of the applicants that in view of the
unpredictability of success in the field of molecular biology at the time of
the publication, the article at most made the invention "obvious to try."
The court noted that the article "contained detailed enabling methodology
for practicing the claimed invention, a suggestion to modify the prior art
to practice the claimed invention, and evidence suggesting that it would be
successful."'4 The existence of some uncertainty as to the outcome of de-
veloping an invention does not make the invention nonobvious if there is a
"reasonable expectation of success." '49
After O'Farrell an invention might be nonobvious, even though it is
"obvious to try," in three situations: (1) if there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of success; (2) if arriving at the invention requires undue experimen-
tation by varying all parameters or trying each of numerous possible
choices in the hope of arriving at a successful result, with no indication in
the prior art of which parameters are critical or no direction as to which
of many possible choices is likely to succeed; or (3) if the prior art merely
suggests exploration of a promising field of experimentation and gives
only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or
Id. at 895 (quoting Patent Application No. 180,424).
• Id. at 899 & n.8. An inventor's own printed publications may be cited as prior art against her
if they disclose or make obvious her subsequently claimed inventions. See, e.g., Massachusetts Inst. of
Tech. v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47 853 F.2d at 900-01.
48 Id. at 902.
49 Id. at 903-04.
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how to achieve it.
Applying this formula to claims to the DNA sequences in human
genes, such inventions are certainly "obvious to try." Moreover, it is in-
creasingly difficult to argue, in light of advances in molecular biology,
protein chemistry and cloning techniques, that there is no reasonable ex-
pectation of success, especially if the amino acid sequence for the protein
is known. Nor can it be argued in most cases that the prior art gives only
general guidance as to how to proceed, unless there is some reason why
the gene cannot be retrieved using standard techniques."0
Where standard techniques are used, the only possible line of argument
is that cloning involves undue experimentation because it requires screen-
ing countless clones for the desired gene. Two recent decisions of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the Board) considered a simi-
lar issue in the context of claims to monoclonal antibodies, reaching oppo-
site results. In Ex parte Old5" the applicant claimed monoclonal antibo-
dies for specific human renal tumor agents. The examiner rejected the
claims as obvious in view of the existence of polyclonal antibodies for
human renal cell antigens and known techniques for preparing
monoclonal antibodies."2 The Board reversed, observing that hybridoma
technology is an empirical art in which results are unpredictable, thus
yielding no "expected" results."3 The following year, a different panel of
the Board affirmed the rejection of claims to monoclonal antibodies for
fibroblast interferon in Ex parte Erlich" with only passing reference to
Ex parte Old. The Board found that "once the antigen of interest is se-
lected, the use of that antigen in the known method ... will result in the
expected hybrid cell lines and the specific monoclonal antibodies," and
that "[olne would have approached this project with a reasonable expecta-
tion of success . . . ."I The Board specifically rejected the argument that
the necessity of screening a large number of hybrid cells for antibody pro-
'o See Murashige, supra note 37, at 297-98.
a' 229 U.S.P.Q. 196 (PTO Bd. App. & Int. 1985).
52 Id. at 199-200.
0' Id. at 200. In dissent, Examiner-in-Chief Merker remarked that "[t]he application of admit-
tedly known standard techniques to admittedly known renal cancer cell lines to produce expected
hybridomas which produce expected monoclonal antibodies.... while laudatory, does not give rise to
a patentable invention." Id. at 200.
5' 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1011 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1986).
" Id. at 1015.
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duction rendered the invention nonobvious, noting that although this step
is "tedious and laborious," it is routine in the hybridoma field. 6
Given that the same technology was involved in both cases, it is difficult
to reconcile the divergent findings in Old and Erlich. Nonetheless, in both
cases the critical inquiry was whether success was reasonably predictable
on the basis of the prior art. Where a gene is cloned successfully using
standard techniques, it is likely that the Patent and Trademark Office will
conclude that success was reasonably predictable. 7 In light of the Erlich
decision, it is doubtful that an inventor could avoid a nonobviousness re-
jection by arguing that identifying the correct clone through standard
techniques involved a tedious screening effort, given that such screening
efforts are routine in the field.
The discovery of the DNA sequence for a human gene may still be
nonobvious under O'Farrell in a case where the gene could not be re-
trieved through standard techniques. The inventor who has to develop a
new technique to isolate a previously unavailable DNA sequence may be
able to claim that sequence as a nonobvious invention, arguing that the
prior art merely suggests a promising field of experimentation but does
not disclose how to find the sequence. This argument was persuasive to
the court in the recent case of Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical
Co.5 In that case the defendant challenged the validity of a claim to a
purified and isolated DNA sequence encoding human erythropoietin on
grounds, inter alia, that the invention was obvious. The court concluded
that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof in light of evidence
that the probing and screening procedures used by the inventor to isolate
the gene were nonobvious.59
This analysis might seem to confuse the patentability of the DNA se-
quence itself with the patentability of the nonobvious process of obtaining
it. It has long been established that one cannot obtain a patent on an old
product merely by developing a new and nonobvious means of obtaining
that product. 0 Nonetheless, a series of uncontradicted cases have allowed
" Id. at 1016.
" See Wiseman, supra note 37, at 409-10.
" 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1764-69 (D. Mass. 1989).
6 Id. at 1767-69.
0 Buono v. Yankee Maid Dress Corp., 77 F.2d 274, 279 (2d Cir. 1935); 2 D. CHISUM, supra
note 16, at § 5.04[8].
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patents on products that were obviously desirable, but unobtainable under
the prior art, to inventors who develop nonobvious means of preparing
such products.6" While this result may seem illogical in purely doctrinal
terms, 2 it makes a certain amount of sense on a practical level. As long as
only one means of making the patented product exists, and all relevant
activities occur in the United States, it makes little difference whether the
patent holder has a monopoly on the product itself or on the only means
of making it."3 The practical significance of conferring a patent monopoly
on the product itself rather than limiting the inventor to a process patent
on a specific means of making the product increases when other means are
developed for making the same product. At that point, if the first inventor
has a product patent, her patent protection remains intact, but if she is
limited to a process patent, she will lose her monopoly position. Thereaf-
ter, because of the difficulty of detecting and proving which of several
"1 See, e.g., In re Irani, 427 F.2d 806 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (reversing rejection of patent on crystal-
line compound ATMP on ground that it would not have been obvious how to make such a product
under prior art); Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1076 (1970), reh'g denied, 398 U.S. 954 (1970) (upholding validity of product patent on artifi-
cial filaments with cruciform shape and linear orientation of molecules on ground that it was not
obvious in prior art how to make such a product); In re Pilkington, 411 F.2d 1345 (C.C.P.A. 1969)
(reversing rejection of product claims to distortion-free glass in application filed by inventor of lead
flotation process of making such glass in view of novelty of product and nonobviousness of manner of
making it); In re Cofer, 354 F.2d 664 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (reversing rejection of product claims to "high
purity diepoxide" to applicant who developed a patentable process of making product, notwithstand-
ing unsuccessful attempts to recover same product in prior art, because prior art failed to disclose
means of making product).
2 Chisum criticizes the cases cited supra in note 61 for failing to determine the obviousness of
the product independently from the obviousness of the process for making it. 2 D. CHISUM, supra
note 16, at § 5.04[8].
13 The difference was somewhat greater at the time of the decisions cited supra in note 61, at
least when the product could be made abroad. Until 1988, it did not constitute infringement of a U.S.
patent to use a patented process outside the country and then import the product of that process into
the United States for sale. So long as the inventor did not make, use, or sell the patented process in the
United States, there was no patent infringement. The patent holder's only remedy was to prevent
importation of the product made by the patented process under § 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, ch.
497, 46 Stat. 590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988)). On the other hand, if the inventor held a
product patent, sale of the product itself in the U.S. would constitute infringement regardless of where
(or how) the product was made. This gap in process patent protection was largely remedied with
passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988), which added a new section 271(g) to the Patent Act providing, with certain qualifications,
that, "Whoever without authority imports into the United States or sells or uses within the United
States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an
infringer, if the importation, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process pat-
ent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (1988).
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available means were used to make an unpatented product, it will be diffi-
cult to enforce the patent on the original patented process even against
those who are in fact using that process. In other words, as a practical
matter a patent on the only known means of making an unpatented prod-
uct may be effective only for as long as it takes someone to develop an-
other means of making the same thing, which may be far less time than
the duration of the patent term.
A rule that limits the first inventor to process patent protection may
consequently provide a considerably weaker incentive to invest in develop-
ing the first means of making an obviously desirable product than a rule
that offers product patent protection. Whether the process patent alone
would provide an adequate incentive to induce the necessary inventive ef-
fort is ultimately an empirical question with an answer that varies from
one invention to the next. Yet the first inventor to develop a means of
making an obviously desirable but previously unobtainable product has
made an invention that the public may well consider worth the price of a
patent monopoly on the product itself. Rather than risk losing valuable
inventions by offering too little patent protection in the form of what may
eventually become an unenforceable process patent, it may be preferable
to offer the higher bounty of a product patent at the outset.
In sum, as the state of knowledge in biotechnology-related fields ad-
vances, it is likely that many newly derived DNA sequences will be
deemed obvious in light of the prior art, particularly if they are derived
using standard techniques. Nonetheless, inventors who develop new and
nonobvious means of cloning previously unavailable DNA sequences may
be able to satisfy the nonobviousness requirement for patenting the se-
quences themselves by showing the nonobviousness of the means used to
obtain them.
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN PATENTING HUMAN DNA
SEQUENCES
Assuming that some human DNA sequences are in fact patentable
under existing patent doctrine, does that outcome make sense? Or would
we be better off as a matter of social policy leaving this information in the
public domain? Given the importance of this information to the public
welfare, might we not better promote its widespread use by leaving it
736 [Vol. 39
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freely available to all?
At one level these questions are not confined to the patentability of
DNA sequences but could as readily be asked about the patent system as
a whole. While the patent system is often justified as a means of providing
incentives to invest in socially valuable research and development, there
are no clear answers to the empirical questions of when these incentives
are needed, or how strong the incentives should be to have an optimal
impact on behavior.6 ' A narrower, somewhat easier question to analyze is,
assuming that the patent system is an appropriate way of stimulating in-
vestment in some areas of research, is there any reason to think that it is a
less appropriate way of stimulating research involving DNA sequences in
the human genome?
A. Federal Funding for Sequencing the Human Genome
One distinction that might justify denying patent protection for human
DNA sequences without calling into question the basis for the patent sys-
tem as a whole is that the federal government is currently funding re-
search to sequence the human genome. It therefore can be argued that
patent incentives are unnecessary to stimulate the development of this in-
formation. Moreover, one might argue that allowing patent protection on
information generated in part through federal funds forces the public to
pay twice for the same invention: first, as taxpayers sponsoring the re-
search, and second, as consumers paying royalties to the patent holder for
use of the invention.
There are several reasons for rejecting these arguments. First, the
amount of federal funding for the Human Genome Project is trivial com-
pared to the amount of private funding for biotechnology research and
development. Current projections for funding once the project is underway
are in the range of $200 million per year.6 5 Amounts allocated to date fall
considerably short of that figure.66 This compares to an estimated $1.5 to
" See generally Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experi-
mental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1021-46 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Patents and Progress].
'5 See Koshland, Sequences and Consequences of the Human Genome, 246 SCIENCE 189 (1989);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 90.
" MeKusick, supra note 3, at 912 ($18 million for fiscal year 1988 and $47 million for fiscal
year 1989); Norman, supra note 1, at 517 ($87 million for fiscal year 1990).
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$2 billion invested by private industry in biotechnology research and de-
velopment in 1987.67 Assuming that continued private funding is contin-
gent on the availability of patent protection,"8 it is doubtful that federal
funding for the Human Genome Project could compensate for the reduc-
tion in private incentives for research and development if patent protection
were denied.
Second, at this point federal funding is limited to mapping and se-
quencing the human genome, and the availability of public funds for sub-
sequent research and development to turn this information into useful
products and processes is uncertain. 9 One might expect that even without
continued public funding at this later stage, the free availability of se-
quence information generated through public funding would promote sub-
sequent research and development better than private control of this infor-
mation under the patent laws. But some scholars believe that the
incentives provided by patent protection are most important after an in-
vention has been made, as a means of stimulating investment in putting
patented inventions to practical use, rather than before the invention has
been made, as a means of stimulating the initial research necessary to
create the invention."0 In the absence of continued public funding, patent
incentives may be necessary to stimulate private investment to take its
place.
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that private firms will need
patent protection on DNA sequences to invest in putting this information
to use. Firms might, instead, protect their investments through patents on
the innovations they make in the course of putting earlier inventions into
use, such as process patents on techniques for making desirable proteins
through recombinant DNA technology. But these processes, although
"' OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECH-
NOLOGY: U.S. INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY - SPECIAL REPORT 80 (1988) [hereinafter IN-
VESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY]. Unfortunately, the OTA figures do not supply a breakdown of the
type of research and development funded by these companies.
68 This, of course, is an unanswered empirical question. See generally Eisenberg, Patents and
Progress, supra note 64, at 1031-33 and sources cited therein (describing attempts in economics liter-
ature to assess impact of patent laws on R&D decisions); see also INVESTMENT IN BIOTECHNOLOGY,
supra note 67, at 101-03 (concluding that uncertainty over patent protection will influence the R&D
strategy of many companies).
6 Federal funding for biomedical research generally has been hard to come by in recent years.
See Palca, Hard Times at NIH, 246 SCIENCE 988 (1989).
'1 See Eisenberg, Patents and Progress, supra note 64, at 1036-44 and sources cited therein.
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costly, are often considered standard in the art and thus unpatentable. 1
Moreover, even when the processes are sufficiently inventive to be patent-
able, it may be difficult to detect and prove infringement of such process
patents. In the absence of effective patent protection for biotechnology
processes, some form of product patent protection may be necessary,
whether the patented products are DNA sequences, recombinant materi-
als incorporating such sequences, or the proteins they produce.
72
Third, while at one time federal government policy viewed private own-
ership of inventions made through public funding as contrary to the pub-
lic interest," this is no longer the case. Objections to patent protection for
inventions made with government funding today contradict the express
policy of the federal government "to use the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or de-
velopment." '74 The 1980 Patent & Trademark Act amendments 5 promote
the patenting and commercialization of inventions arising out of govern-
ment-sponsored research by allowing non-profit research institutions and
small businesses to retain ownership of all patent rights in such inventions
and by allowing large businesses to receive exclusive licenses for specific
uses of such inventions." The legislative history of these provisions re-
flects a policy of promoting industrial innovation by "encourag[ing] pri-
vate industry to utilize government funded inventions through the commit-
ment of the risk capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point
" See In re Durden, 763 F.2d 1406 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (affirming rejection of claims to obvious
process of using novel and nonobvious starting materials to produce novel and nonobvious end prod-
ucts); In re Albertson, 332 F.2d 379 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (same). But cf. In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (upholding patentability of claim to use of old culture techniques to produce old
product using new strain of bacteria in view of prior unavailability of starting material); In re Kuehl,
475 F.2d 658 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (upholding patentability of claim to process of using novel material,
notwithstanding that prior art disclosed identical process using similar but patentably different materi-
als, noting that obviousness of process must be determined without reference to knowledge of new
materials). For an effort to reconcile these cases, see Wiseman, supra note 37, at 410-11.
71 Patents on purified proteins may offer particularly broad protection. In infringement litigation
in the recombinant DNA industry, courts have construed patent claims directed to purified proteins as
extending to the same proteins produced through recombinant DNA technology. See Amgen, Inc. v.
Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 706 F. Supp. 94 (D. Mass. 1989); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v.
Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified inl 678 F. Supp. 1429 (N.D. Cal.
1988), claims held invalid in 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
" See Eisenberg, Rights and Norms, supra note 11, at 181-82 and sources cited therein.
74 35 U.S.C. § 200 (1988).
71 Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211 (1988)).




B. Promoting Progress in Basic Scientific Research
A somewhat different line of argument that may come closer to the
basis for objections to intellectual property protection held by scientists
involved in the Human Genome Project is that, even if commercial devel-
opment is better served by allowing patent protection, continuing progress
in scientific research will be better served by leaving the human genome in
the public domain. Information concerning human DNA sequences is vi-
tal to the future course of basic research in the biomedical sciences,7 8 and
allowing this information to be controlled by private patent owners could
retard scientific progress in these fields. The scientific community operates
on a principle of communal ownership of research results rather than pri-
vate ownership.79 The possibility of obtaining patent rights thus threatens
the mechanisms of the scientific community for generating and disseminat-
ing new knowledge by hampering communications among scientists and
impeding the use of prior research results in subsequent research.8"
I have analyzed this line of argument at length elsewhere" and will
only summarize the analysis here. Since patent protection has traditionally
been confined to the practical results of applied research and has been
unavailable for basic research discoveries, the implications of patent pro-
tection for discoveries that are significant to both basic and applied re-
search are not well understood. While some fears of scientists that patent
protection will interfere with the progress of science are well-founded,
some are misguided.
Both patent law and scientific norms favor full disclosure of new discov-
eries to the public.8 2 Indeed, patent law may be more rigorous in enforc-
ing its disclosure requirements than the scientific community is in enforc-
ing its own disclosure norms. In the long run it is thus unlikely that
7 H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6460, 6462.
7' See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at 26-33.
70 Eisenberg, Patents and Progress, supra note 64, at 1046-66 and sources cited therein.
:0 See Eisenberg, Rights and Nonns, supra note 11.
01 See generally id.; Eisenberg, Patents and Progress, supra note 64.
82 See Eisenberg, Rights and Norms, supra note 11, at 181-84, 197-205, 207-17.
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patent protection for human DNA sequences will prevent dissemination
of this knowledge to the scientific community and the public at large. In-
deed, one might expect that less disclosure would occur if patent protec-
tion for DNA sequences were denied, inasmuch as inventors would then
be compelled to rely on secrecy to protect their newly discovered
sequences.
On the other hand, disclosure through the patent system is likely to
occur considerably later than disclosure motivated solely by scientific
norms and rewards. Although both the patent law and the scientific com-
munity reward priority of invention and thus place a premium on prompt
disclosure of new discoveries, patent applicants are likely to publish their
discoveries later than scientists who are indifferent to intellectual property
rights. One reason for this difference is that some discoveries may be ripe
for recognition in the scientific community before they are ripe for patent
protection. Yet a scientist who publishes the results of research that has
not yet yielded a patentable invention may jeopardize her prospects for
obtaining patent protection on inventions emanating from this research in
the future because her own publications will become prior art that may be
cited against her.8 Scientists who hope to secure patents may therefore
defer publication until their research has yielded patentable inventions,
thereby slowing down the dissemination of new knowledge to the scientific
community.
In theory, once an inventor has made a patentable invention and filed a
patent application, she is free to publish her research results without com-
promising her patent rights. But an inventor who is uncertain about the
patentability of her invention might defer publication until a patent actu-
ally issues"4 in order to preserve the option of protecting the invention
through trade secrecy. Given the current backlog of biotechnology patent
" Recall that this happened to the inventors in In re O'Farrell. See supra notes 44-49 and
accompanying text.
"' Patent applicants who simultaneously seek foreign patent protection will not be able to keep
their inventions secret for this long because the patent laws of other nations typically provide for
publication of a pending patent application at a specified time after filing and prior to issuance of the
patent. For example, if an applicant seeks international patent protection under the Patent Coopera-
tion Treaty or the European Patent Convention, the application will be published 18 months after the
filing date. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, art. 21, 28 U.S.T. 7647, 7666-67, T.I.A.S. No.
8733, at 7666-67; European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 93, translated in K. HAERTEL,




applications in the PTO, a patent applicant may have to wait four to five
years after the application date before the patent examiner reaches a final
decision on whether to issue a patent. 85 This particular dimension to the
delay in disseminating new information by patent applicants could be
ameliorated by greater certainty as to the patentability of DNA sequences,
which would make applicants more willing to disclose their inventions
before a patent issues. Nonetheless, under patent law as it now stands,
there is gooa reason to fear that inventors whose disclosure decisions are
motivated by intellectual property considerations will disclose their discov-
eries considerably later than scientists who are motivated solely by scien-
tific norms and rewards.
Patent protection may also impede scientific progress even after disclos-
ure occurs if it gives patent holders the power to stop others from using
their discoveries in subsequent research.8 In this respect the conflict be-
tween the patent system and scientific norms seems intractable: the patent
system rests on the premise that scientific progress will best be promoted
by conferring exclusive rights in new discoveries, while the research sci-
ence community has traditionally proceeded on the opposite assumption
that science will advance most rapidly if the community enjoys free access
to prior discoveries."
This conflict could be minimized by exempting the use of patented in-
ventions in research from infringement liability. But although many cases
have recognized such an exemption in dicta, the scope of the exemption is
unclear. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has characterized
the exemption as "truly narrow,""8 suggesting that legislative action may
be necessary in order to clarify the rights of researchers to use patented
inventions without first obtaining licenses.
Even without an experimental use exemption from infringement liabil-
ity, holders of patents on human DNA sequences might not enforce their
exclusive rights against subsequent researchers. The use of patented DNA
"' See Crawford, Patent Clahn Buildup Haunts Biotechnology, 239 SCIENCE 723 (1988).
66 The issues addressed in text are more fully explored in Eisenberg, Rights and Norms, supra
note 11, at 217-26 and Eisenberg, Patents and Progress, supra note 64.
" For an analysis of the underlying logic of each of these viewpoints, see Eisenberg, Patents and
Progress, supra note 64, at 1024-66.
88 Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied sub non. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co. v. Roche Prods., Inc., 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
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sequences in research laboratories might not come to the attention of pat-
ent holders or, if it did, it might not provoke any objections. It may not be
worth the trouble to sue a researcher or university for patent infringe-
ment, particularly if the research does not threaten the commercial inter-
ests of the patent holder. Some patent holders would probably be de-
lighted to see scientists using their sequences in subsequent research,
hoping that this research will ultimately enhance the value of their
patents.
On the other hand, some patent holders might be reluctant to allow the
use of their inventions in research, fearing that subsequent researchers
will develop non-infringing substitutes for the patented inventions which
would undermine the value of their patents. Such patent holders might be
unwilling to offer licenses to researchers, or might charge them exorbitant
royalties. But even if most patent holders do not object to the use of their
inventions in research or are willing to extend licenses for nominal royal-
ties, the need to contact patent holders and obtain licenses to use their
inventions in research could add significantly to the administrative bur-
dens of researchers in fields where patent protection is widespread.
An experimental use exemption from infringement liability could pre-
vent patents from burdening the progress of research science while still
preserving incentives for private investment in research and development
in biotechnology. This might be a better solution to the conflict between
patent law and scientific norms than denying patent protection entirely in
fields where basic science and commercial interests converge.
While there is reason to fear that patent protection for human DNA
sequences could cause delays in the publication and dissemination of new
knowledge about the human genome and could enable some patent hold-
ers to stop the use of their patented sequences in subsequent research, it is
not clear that denying patent protection is the most appropriate solution to
these problems. So long as newly derived DNA sequences have commer-
cial value, the absence of patent protection might impede the dissemina-
tion of information even more by leaving commercial firms with no alter-
native to secrecy as a means of preserving exclusive rights. The problem
of interim secrecy while inventors pursue patent protection could be ame-
liorated by providing greater certainty as to the patentability of DNA se-
quences and streamlining administrative procedures in the PTO to expe-
dite the issuance of patents. Moreover, concerns that patent holders might
1990]
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use their exclusive rights to block the use of their patented sequences in
subsequent research would be better met by an appropriately framed ex-
perimental use exemption from infringement liability than by denying
patent protection entirely.
CONCLUSION
As the Human Genome Project gets under way, some scientists have
spoken out against allowing private intellectual property rights in human
DNA sequences. Meanwhile, the Patent and Trademark Office has been
issuing patents on newly derived human DNA sequences to private par-
ties. While these sequences may satisfy subject matter and novelty re-
quirements for patentability, the validity of some of these patents may still
be subject to challenge on grounds of obviousness. Nonetheless, at the very
least, it seems likely that DNA sequences whose identification and isola-
tion required the development of new and inventive techniques would be
held nonobvious and patentable under present law.
Given the importance of funding from private industry to biomedical
research today, it is not clear that patent protection for DNA sequences is
a bad thing. The small amounts of federal funding projected for the
Human Genome Project cannot be expected to displace private funding in
this area. Moreover, even if public funding were sufficient to generate the
sequence information itself, the lack of intellectual property rights in
DNA sequences might undermine incentives for the private sector to sup-
port subsequent research to put this information to practical use. Since
1980, federal law has promoted private exploitation of patent rights in
inventions emanating from federally-sponsored research as a means of
promoting the development of these inventions.
There is some reason. for concern that the pursuit of patent rights in
human DNA sequences might interfere with scientific progress. Inventors
who seek patent protection might delay publication and dissemination of
their research results, and patent holders might use their exclusive rights
to stop subsequent research by others. But denying patent protection does
not seem to be the best solution to these problems. Indeed, in the absence
of patent protection, inventors who are motivated to protect their intellec-
tual property might be even less inclined to publish their results since they
would have to rely on secrecy as a means of preserving exclusivity.
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Problems of interim secrecy under the patent laws could be ameliorated
by increasing certainty as to the availability of patent protection and de-
creasing delays in the patent office. Concerns about patent holders block-
ing the use of their inventions in subsequent research might be better met
through an experimental use exemption to patent infringement liability
than through denying patent protection entirely.
The scientists' objections to intellectual property rights in the human
genome undoubtedly rest in part on symbolic considerations. Wary of a
public that has voiced strong objections to recombinant DNA research in
the past, the scientific community may want to claim for itself the high
road of promoting the public welfare over private gain in order to forestall
opposition to the Human Genome Project. Scientists would like to think
that they are involved in a cooperative effort for the advancement of
knowledge and the betterment of humanity, not in a self-interested effort
to privatize new knowledge for profit. But this begs the question of how
best to promote the advancement of knowledge and the betterment of hu-
manity. If private intellectual property rights in human DNA sequences
are indeed inconsistent with these goals, then the human genome should
certainly remain in the public domain. But given the substantial and
growing dependence of biomedical research on private funding, we should
be cautious about assuming that private intellectual property rights will
retard progress in these fields.
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